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Abstract
Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and
wealth in society, but there is probably no more contentious question of
justice than how to allocate the gains and losses that inevitably result from
risky choices. This paper reports the results from the first experiment, to
our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, where the main
aim is to examine whether people’s fairness considerations mainly focus on
ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes. The experiment was a two stage
dictator game where the distribution phase was preceded by a risk-taking
phase. Our analysis provides four main findings. First, we show that
even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities,
the majority favors some redistribution ex post. Second, we find that,
among the participants who redistribute ex post, a substantial share make
a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck
and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. Third, we show
that the appeal of the ex ante view is independent of how costly it is to
avoid exposure to risk. Fourth, we find that the choices of stakeholders
and impartial spectators reflect the same set of fairness considerations.
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1 Introduction
Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth
in society, but there is probably no more contentious question of justice than
how to allocate the gains and losses that inevitably result from risky choices.
This is reflected in the many heated debates about the fairness of public policies
dealing with consequences of risk-taking, including welfare and social security
policies, income and profit taxation, and, as illustrated by the recent financial
crisis, government bailouts of distressed industries.
How to deal fairly with risk-taking is often cast in terms of the question of
whether to focus on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes.1 The conflict be-
tween these two views is most clearly seen when people have equal opportunities.
In such cases, the ex ante view, which focuses on initial opportunities, provides
a fairness argument for no redistribution of gains and losses from risk-taking.
The ex post view, on the other hand, focuses on outcomes, and provides a fair-
ness argument for eliminating all inequalities resulting from risk-taking. Clearly,
such fairness considerations need to be balanced against efficiency concerns, but
this conflict illustrates how, potentially, people’s fairness views about risk-taking
could significantly impact the support for and, consequently, the design of pub-
lic policies. Such views are arguably important for understanding behavior in a
wide range of economic contexts, including the behavior of workers, labor unions,
managers, and government regulators.
This paper reports the results from the first experiment, to our knowledge,
to study fairness views about risk-taking.2 The study focuses on cases in which
it is costly to avoid risk; thus, we do not consider gambling or other risk-seeking
behavior. The experiment consisted of two stages, a risk-taking phase followed
by a distribution phase. In the risk-taking phase, participants faced a sequence
of choices between a risky and a safe alternative, where the value of the safe
alternative varied. In the distribution phase, for each risk-taking situation, the
participants were anonymously paired with other participants who had faced
the same choice and the earnings of each pair were pooled. In all distributive
1There is an extensive literature on how to evaluate risky situations within both economics
and philosophy. See, among others, Harsanyi (1955); Diamond (1967); Hammond (1981); Fried
(2003); Harel, Safra, and Segal (2005); Fleurbaey (2007).
2Various recent experimental and theoretical studies have examined possible trade-offs be-
tween the desire to achieve a fair distribution and the desire to avoid risk (Babicky 2003;
Babicky and Ortmann 2005; Brennan, Gonza´lez, Gu¨th, and Levati 2008; Krawczyk and Le Lec
2008). The work of Zizzo (Zizzo 2003, 2004), including a paper with Oswald (Zizzo and Oswald
2001), comes closest to our study. In a series of interesting experiments, subjects first choose
how much to invest in a risky gamble, earnings are distributed and then subjects can (and often
do) destroy the earnings of other participants. Our study differs in several respects, but most
importantly we place no restrictions on how the participants choose to distribute the money
in the distribution phase and this allows us to focus on the fairness preferences of individuals
rather than on envy.
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situations, therefore, we had ex ante equality in opportunities, but possibly ex
post inequalities in individual earnings. The participants were then informed
about the choices and the outcomes of the risk-taking phase for both parties and
asked to distribute the total earnings.
This design enables us to focus on our two main questions. First, do people in
situations of equal opportunities deviate from the ex ante fairness view and redis-
tribute gains and losses from risk-taking? Second, do people make a distinction
between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequal-
ities that reflect differences in choices? An intermediate fairness position, which
we refer to as choice egalitarianism, holds people responsible for their choices,
but not for their luck. Such a view would endorse ex post redistribution between
lucky and unlucky risk-takers but not between risk-takers and participants who
choose the safe alternative.3 The design also allows us to study whether the
attractiveness of the ex ante view depends on how costly it is to avoid risks, as
captured by the value of the safe alternative. A conjecture in this regard is that
the ex ante position would be considered less appealing in cases where the safe
alternative is very unattractive, and, as a result, the risky alternative appears
virtually unavoidable.
In addition to the “stakeholder” described thus far, who made decisions about
risk-taking and redistribution, we also randomly assigned some participants to
the role as “spectator” in the experiment. The spectators did not make choices
in the risk-taking phase but instead acted as third parties who were paid a fixed
fee to allocate the total earnings of other subjects in the distribution phase.
Specifically, spectators distributed the pooled earnings of pairs of stakeholders in
a randomly selected subsample of the situations. By comparing the behavior of
the two groups, one can examine the extent to which the fairness considerations of
stakeholders deviate from the fairness views of impartial spectators. In particular,
this allows us to study whether the involvement in the risk-taking phase makes
stakeholders assign more importance to choices in the distribution phase. This
comparison is also of considerable importance from a methodological point of
view. Previous empirical research on the nature of social preferences has relied on
both spectator (Konow, Saijo, and Akai 2009; Konow 2000, 2009) and stakeholder
behavior (Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden 2007b; Cherry, Frykblom,
and Shogren 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Kurki 2004), but this is the first study to look at whether these
two approaches support the same set of findings within a given experiment.
Our analysis provides four main findings. First, we show that, although the
ex ante fairness view is the most prominent among the participants, the majority
of participants favor some ex post redistribution, even when, as here, people had
3This fairness perspective has been discussed extensively in the philosophical literature (see
Dworkin 1981a,b; Arneson 1989; Lippert-Rasmussen 2001; Fleurbaey 2002; Vallentyne 2002;
Fried 2003).
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the same ex ante opportunities. Second, we find that, among the participants
who redistribute earnings, a substantial share make a distinction between ex post
inequalities resulting from different choices versus ex post inequalities that result
from differences in luck. Overall, most participants find it fair not to equalize ex
post inequalities that result from different choices, but most also find it fair to
equalize ex post inequalities resulting from differences in luck among risk-takers.
Third, we show that the appeal of the ex ante view is independent of how costly
it is to avoid exposure to risk. Fourth, we find that the choices of stakeholders
and spectators reflect the same set of fairness considerations. Thus, the two
approaches support the same set of conclusions about fairness preferences over
the gains and losses from risk-taking.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design.
Section 3 analyzes the choices of spectators. Section 4 introduces a model of
distributive choice that we estimate for both spectators and stakeholders. Section
5 concludes.
2 Design and procedures
We recruited participants among students at the Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration (NHH) in Bergen, Norway. A total of 119 subjects
participated in the four sessions that lasted about 40 minutes and that all took
place on the same day. Including a 100 NOK show up fee, subjects earned, on
average, 472 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) or about 75 USD. The experiment was
conducted in a computer lab using web-based interface and was double blind,
i.e., neither subjects nor experimenters could associate decisions with particular
subjects. Moreover, earnings were paid anonymously by wire using payment codes
through an independent accounting division, a fact that was communicated to
all subjects.
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned
to be either stakeholders (78 subjects) or spectators (41 subjects). There were
two decision-making phases: a risk-taking phase and a distribution phase. Only
stakeholders participated in the risk-taking phase, in which they were asked to
choose between a safe alternative and a risky alternative. In all four risk-taking
situations, the risky alternative contained two equally likely outcomes of 800
NOK and 0 NOK. Hence, the expected value of the risky alternative was always
400 NOK. The safe alternative varied across the four situations and took on
the values 400 NOK, 300 NOK, 200 NOK or 25 NOK. The four situations were
presented in random order.
Table 1 provides an overview of the choices made by the 78 stakeholders in
the risk-taking phase. Only 7 participants made choices that reflected potentially
risk-loving preferences. Hence, almost all participants were weakly risk averse,
but none so risk averse as to choose the safe alternative when it had a value of
4
25 NOK. Considering the complete set of choices of each stakeholder, we observe
that the preferences of all but five obey monotonicity, i.e., a subject who chooses
the risky alternative for a high value of the safe alternative also does so for lower
values of the safe alternative.
[Table 1 about here.]
In the distribution phase, stakeholders were anonymously and randomly
paired with a sequence of eight other stakeholders. For each pair, one of the
four situations from the risk-taking phase was randomly drawn and the stake-
holder was asked to determine how the pooled earnings of the two stakeholders
should be distributed among them. Before they made their choice, the partic-
ipants were informed about the choices and outcomes of the risk-taking phase
for both parties. Thus, there was no uncertainty about the source of inequal-
ity in earnings. Moreover, given that this was a one-shot experiment, incentive
considerations should not influence the choices of the participants. The distribu-
tive situations were presented in random order, and after making their decisions,
the participants were given a final opportunity to revise all of them, if desired.
Correspondingly, the spectators made eight distributive choices from a randomly
selected subsample of the distributive situations faced by the stakeholders. The
spectators were provided with the same information as the stakeholders. In total,
we have 530 distributive situations with positive total earnings; 112 distributive
situations where one stakeholder chose the risky alternative and the other stake-
holder chose the safe alternative, 152 distributive situations where both stake-
holders choose the safe alternative, and 266 distributive situations where both
chose the risky alternative and at least one of them was lucky. Spectators made
choices in 283 distributive situations with positive earnings.
At the beginning of the experiment, stakeholders were told that the computer
would randomly choose one of the situations they were involved in to determine
their final outcome. Spectators received a fixed payment of NOK 350 unrelated
to their decisions.
3 Ex ante or ex post?
We begin by analyzing the distributive choices of spectators, presented in panels
A-E in Figure 1.
We observe in panel A that the most common choice among spectators is to
distribute equally among the two participants. This is predominantly the case
when there is equality in individual earnings (panel C), but, interestingly, equal
split is also the most common choice when ex post earnings are unequal (panel
B). Clearly, therefore, many spectators deviate from the ex ante position in their
distributive choices and deem it fair to redistribute earnings ex post.
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[Figure 1 about here.]
Many spectators, however, make a distinction between different sources of ex
post inequalities. As shown in Figure 1, spectators choose to equalize earnings
in more than 40 percent of the distributive situations where lucky and unlucky
risk-takers meet (panel D), whereas this only happens in about 20 percent of the
distributive situations where a risk-taker is paired with a participant choosing
the safe alternative (panel E). It is evident, therefore, that many spectators con-
sider ex post inequalities between participants who have made different choices
acceptable but find ex post inequalities due to luck unfair (even in cases where
people have equal opportunities and risk is avoidable).
Is deviation from the ex ante perspective more frequent in situations where it
is very costly for the participants to avoid risk? To study this question, we look at
the level of redistribution among spectators in situations where lucky risk-takers
are paired with unlucky risk-takers. In such situations, the total earnings to be
distributed is always 800 NOK, i.e., equal to the individual ex post earnings of
the lucky risk-taker. Table 2 shows how much of this is transferred ex post to
the unlucky risk-taker. We observe that the share transferred is invariant to the
value of the safe alternative; in all three cases, the unlucky risk-taker receives on
average about 30 percent of the total earnings. Hence, spectators do not make
a distinction between situations where risk is almost unavoidable and situations
where the cost of avoiding risk is relatively small.
[Table 2 about here.]
Overall, the data show that the ex ante, the ex post and the choice egalitarian
fairness views can account for almost 80 percent of the distributive choices made
by the spectators, i.e., almost all choices are in line with at least one of these
fairness views. Hence, given that there is always some stochastic behavior in
an experiment, the three views seem to capture the fairness considerations of
the spectators. This does not, however, provide us with a precise measure of
the frequency of each of the fairness views among the spectators, since these
views coincide in a number of distributive situations, for example, when there
is equality in ex post earnings. In order to address this issue, we formulate a
model of individual distributive preferences and then estimate which distribution
of fairness views best explains the behavior of the participants. This also allows
us to compare the fairness views of the spectators and the stakeholders. As can
be observed from panel F in Figure 1, stakeholders equalize much less frequently
than spectators. Stakeholders equalize in only about 20 percent of the distributive
situations, in the majority of the remaining situations they take everything for
themselves. The latter is consistent with stakeholders being motivated by self-
interest in their distributive choices, but a model is needed to determine whether
these choices also are consistent with the fairness considerations made by the
spectators.
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4 A model of distributive choice
In this section we introduce a model of distributive choice that enables us to study
further the frequency of the different fairness views and the role of self-interest.
We assume that a stakeholder is motivated by fairness considerations and by
income when considering how to distribute the total earnings X generated in the
risk-taking phase. More specifically, we assume that stakeholder i is maximizing
the following utility function when making distributive choices:
V
k(i)
i (yi; ·) = γyi − βi(yi − F k(i))2/2X, (1)
where yi is what a stakeholder i allocates to him- or herself, and F
k(i) is what a
stakeholder considers to be his or her fair income. Stakeholders might differ both
in the weight they attach to fairness considerations and in what they consider to
be a fair distribution. For an interior solution, the optimal proposal, y∗i , is
y∗i = F
k(i) + γ/βiX. (2)
Hence, a stakeholder takes at least what he or she considers fair, and more de-
pending on how much weight he or she assigns to fairness. We assume that
spectators maximize the same utility function, with two exceptions: the first
term is always zero, and the second term is defined for the spectator’s prefer-
ences over the income of one of the two stakeholders in a pair. Hence, trivially,
the interior solution for a specatator is to choose what he or she considers the
fair allocation of the total earnings between the two stakeholders.
Informed by our analysis of spectators in Section 3, we assume that the in-
dividuals endorse the ex post (EP), ex ante (EA), or choice egalitarian (CE)
fairness views.
FEPi =
1
2
X, (3)
FEAi = xi, (4)
FCEi =
{
1
2
X if Ci = Cj,
xi if Ci 6= Cj
(5)
where xi is individual i’s earnings and Ci takes the value 1 if the individual
chooses the risky alternative and the value 0 otherwise.
4.1 Estimates of the choice model
We assume a discrete choice random utility model of the form
Ui(y; ·) = V k(i)i (y; ·) + yi, for y = 0, 25, . . . , X, (6)
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where the yi are assumed to be iid extreme value. For each individual, with a
fixed (k, β), the choice probabilities then have a simple logit form. We assume
that βi has a log normal distribution, such that log β ∼ N(ζ, σ2).
Let the vector θ represent all parameters to be estimated. We can now write
the likelihood contribution of an individual conditional on a fairness perspective
k as,
Lki (θ) =
∫ ∞
0
(
Ji∏
j=1
eV
k(yij ;,β,·)∑
s∈Yij e
V k(s;β,·)
)
dF (β; ζ, σ). (7)
The index j = 1, . . . , Ji indicates the number of choices made by individual i
and Yij is the choice set {0, . . . , X} for individual i in situation j. For the total
likelihood contribution of an individual, we must weight with the population
shares of individuals with different fairness views, λEA, λCE, and λEP ,
Li(θ) =
∑
k
λkLki (θ). (8)
Table 3 reports estimates for different specifications of the model. The pop-
ulation share for each of the fairness views is the estimated proportion of the
participants motivated by this particular fairness standard.
[Table 3 about here.]
From the estimates in (1), we observe that the ex ante standard is the most
frequent fairness view among the participants, accounting for the behavior of
around 40 percent of the individuals. Still, a majority of the participants endorses
ex post redistribution when ex post inequalities reflect differences in luck. Only
a minority of around 30 percent endorses equalization of all ex post inequalities.
In specification (1) of Table 3, stakeholders and spectators are assumed to have
different distributions of β, but are restricted to have the same population shares
of individuals holding the different fairness views. In specification (2), we loosen
the restriction that the population shares are the same among stakeholders and
spectators. It turns out that this restriction is not binding, as can be seen from the
very similar estimates of λEA, λCE, and λEP for the two groups, as well as from the
small change in the likelihood value. Thus, the model provides strong evidence of
spectators and stakeholders making the same set of fairness considerations in this
experiment, their choices differing only in that the stakeholders also are motivated
by self-interest. In specifications 3-5, we show that all three fairness views are
needed in order to explain the data; dropping any of them would substantially
reduce the log likelihood value.4
4Note that since the hypothesis that one of the λk is zero is on the boundary of the parameter
space, standard likelihood ratio tests do not apply (Andrews 2001).
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4.2 How well does the estimated model fit the data?
To study how well the model fits the data, we use the model to simulate and
predict the actual distribution of data in different situations.
[Figure 2 about here.]
As we can see from Figure 2, the model fits very nicely the behavior of both
stakeholders and spectators. One might have expected more noise in the choices
of spectators than among stakeholders, since spectators do not have any economic
incentives in the choices they make, but this is not borne out in the data. This
most likely reflects that the moral incentives created by the distributive situations
being real is sufficient to motivate spectators in distributive choices, which is
consistent with evidence from other studies, e.g., (Konow 2009).
4.3 Fairness preferences and political views
A motivation for this study was the prominent role played by arguments of fair-
ness in political debates on public policies dealing with consequences of risk-
taking. Hence, it is interesting to examine whether the fairness views identified
in this experiment relates in any systematic manner to the participants’ politi-
cal views. Is it the case that the ex ante view, holding individuals responsible
for both their choices and luck, is more prominent among right-wing people, and
that the ex post fairness view, opposing all inequalities, is more prominent among
left-wing people?
At the end of the experiment we asked the participants about their political
views, to place themselves on a seven point scale with with very left-wing and
very right-wing as the extreme points. The distribution of responses is reported
in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
We observe that the majority of students identified themselves as right-wing,
which might reflect that these are students at a business school. In order to
obtain equally sized groups in the following analysis, we have classified “slightly
right-wing” as moderate, and grouped the rest into left-wing and right-wing,
respectively.
In order to compare these responses to individual behavior in the experiment,
we need to use the estimates reported in specification (1) Table 3 to identify
the likelihood of any specific individual holding a particular fairness view. Given
an individual’s choices, we calculate the individual a posteriori probabilities by
applying Bayes’ theorem,
P (k|y, Z) = P (y|k, Z)P (k|Z)
P (y|Z) for k ∈ {EA,CE,EP}, (9)
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where P (k|y, Z) is the a posteriori probability of having the fairness view k given
that the choice y is made in a situation described by the vector Z. These proba-
bilities can be calculated by applying (7) and (8).5
Figure 3 shows how well the model identifies fairness views at the individual
level, by reporting the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the most
likely fairness ideal for each individual. We observe that almost all spectators are
identified very precisely, and almost half of the stakeholders.6
[Figure 3 about here.]
Table 5 reports how the average a posteriori probability of having each of
the three fairness views relates to political views. Interestingly, we observe that
moderate and right-wing individuals are much more likely to hold the ex ante
fairness view, whereas the ex post fairness view is most likely among left-wing
individuals. This suggests that the fairness preferences expressed in this exper-
iment reflect deeper political convictions, and, consequently, that the observed
heterogeneity in fairness views also is present in situations outside the lab where
gains and losses from risk-taking are to distributed.
[Table 5 about here.]
5 Concluding remarks
Our experiment provides strong evidence that many people consider fairness to
go beyond equalizing opportunities in the context of risk-taking. Still, mirror-
ing the political debate, the experiment also reveals considerable disagreement
on how to allocate fairly the gains and losses from risk-taking. A substantial
share of the participants endorse the ex ante view, but a substantial share also
endorse the ex post view. However, if we look separately at how to deal with
inequalities between lucky and unlucky risk-takers and between risk-takers and
people choosing the safe alternative, we find, on each issue, that the majority of
the participants endorse the choice egalitarian consideration. On the issue of how
to distribute between lucky and unlucky risk-takers, the majority finds it fair to
eliminate inequalities. On the issue of how to distribute between risk-takers and
people choosing the safe alternative, the majority finds inequalities in outcomes
justifiable.
5The expression P (y|k, Z) corresponds to Lki (θ) as defined in (7), P (k|Z) is simply the
population share λk, and P (y|Z) is the total likelihood contribution Li(θ) defined in (8). For
further discussion of this approach, see Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden
(2007a).
6There is also a substantial share of stakeholders that are hard to identify, mainly because
they took everything for themselves.
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If these estimates reflect general political views, as indicated by our analysis, it
has interesting implications for which public policies could gain political support
from the majority of voters. To illustrate, consider the case of smoking. Smoking
is a risky activity; some smokers, but not all, end up with a need for costly
treatment. Given equal opportunities, what would be a fair distribution of costs
of such health care? The choice egalitarian view implies that the fair solution is
that non-smokers are not required to contribute to financing such treatment, but
that the costs of treatment are shared equally among lucky and unlucky smokers
(Cappelen and Norheim 2005).
To highlight that risk-taking raises new questions of fairness, the present study
has focussed on how to deal with risk-taking in a setting of equal opportunities.
Important avenues for future research would be to study people’s fairness views
on risk-taking where there is inequality in initial opportunities, and the extent
to which they vary across contexts and cultures.
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Figure 1: Histograms of share given
Note: A: Distribution of all spectator decisions, share given to one of the stake-
holders (randomly defined). B: Distribution of spectator decisions where there
are unequal ex post earnings, share given to one of the stakeholders (randomly
defined). C: Distribution of spectator decisions when ex post earnings are equal,
share given to one of the stakeholders (randomly defined). D: Distribution of
spectator decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share given to lucky risk-taker.
E: Distribution of spectator decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to
risk-taker. F: Distribution of all stakeholder decisions, share given to the other
participant.
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted share given by stakeholders and spectators in
various situations
Note: A: Distribution of stakeholder decisions when ex post earnings are equal,
share given to the other participant. B: Distribution of spectator decisions when
ex post earnings are equal, share given to one of the stakeholders (randomly de-
fined). C: Distribution of stakeholder decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share
given to the other participant. D: Distribution of spectator decisions when lucky
meets unlucky, share given to lucky risk-taker. E: Distribution of stakeholder
decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to the other participant. F:
Distribution of spectator decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to
risk-taker.
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Figure 3: Identification of fairness views at the individual level
Note: The histograms shows the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the
most likely fairness ideal for each individual, maxk{P (k|y, Z}, for stakeholders
and spectators. Calculations are based on specification (1) in Table 3.
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Table 1: Risk choices made by participants.
Risk choice
Value of safe alternative safe alternative risky alternative Total
25 0 78 78
200 5 73 78
300 28 50 78
400 71 7 78
104 208 312
Table 2: Redistribution when a lucky risk-taker meets an unlucky risk-taker
(spectators)
Value of safe alternative Average share redistributed
25 0.338
(0.041)
n = 41
200 0.321
(0.045)
n = 36
300 0.319
(0.053)
n = 18
Note: Share redistributed is defined as share of total earnings transferred to the
unlucky risk-taker. Standard errors in parantheses.
17
T
ab
le
3:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
ch
oi
ce
m
o
d
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
p
ar
am
et
er
S
ta
ke
h
ol
d
er
S
p
ec
ta
to
r
S
ta
ke
h
ol
d
er
S
p
ec
ta
to
r
S
ta
ke
h
ol
d
er
S
p
ec
ta
to
r
S
ta
ke
h
ol
d
er
S
p
ec
ta
to
r
S
ta
ke
h
ol
d
er
S
p
ec
ta
to
r
λ
E
P
0.
28
8
0.
27
4
0.
30
2
0.
38
1
0.
50
0
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
63
)
λ
C
E
0.
29
3
0.
31
5
0.
27
2
0.
61
9
0.
56
9
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
66
)
λ
E
A
0.
41
9
0.
41
1
0.
42
7
0.
50
0
0.
43
1
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
66
)
ζ
3.
09
4
6.
95
9
3.
09
4
6.
96
0
1.
61
2
3.
55
4
3.
03
9
4.
98
4
3.
01
2
4.
90
1
(0
.5
01
)
(0
.6
80
)
(0
.5
03
)
(0
.6
83
)
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.8
86
)
(0
.4
91
)
(0
.6
76
)
(0
.4
86
)
(0
.6
86
)
σ
4.
37
9
4.
66
1
4.
37
8
4.
66
0
4.
66
7
5.
10
2
4.
05
9
4.
22
7
3.
91
0
4.
38
1
(0
.6
53
)
(0
.7
06
)
(0
.6
55
)
(0
.7
06
)
(0
.6
39
)
(0
.9
07
)
(0
.5
93
)
(0
.6
42
)
(0
.5
64
)
(0
.6
70
)
γ
15
.5
71
15
.5
77
10
.7
18
14
.5
25
13
.2
41
(0
.4
98
)
(0
.5
09
)
(0
.2
59
)
(0
.4
88
)
(0
.4
58
)
lo
g
L
-1
80
7.
19
-1
80
7.
13
-2
06
7.
62
-1
93
0.
85
-1
97
1.
60
N
ot
e:
T
h
e
li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
is
m
ax
im
iz
ed
u
si
n
g
th
e
F
m
O
p
t
li
b
ra
ry
(F
er
ra
ll
20
05
).
O
n
e
p
op
u
la
ti
on
sh
ar
e
(λ
k
)
an
d
it
s
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
r
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
re
si
d
u
al
ly
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
(i
n
p
ar
en
th
es
es
)
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
ou
te
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
of
th
e
gr
ad
ie
n
t
(B
er
n
d
t,
H
al
l,
H
al
l,
an
d
H
au
sm
an
19
74
).
18
Table 4: Distribution of responses on political views
frequency share cumulative share
1. very left wing 0 0 0.0
2. left wing 7 0.059 0.059
3. slightly left wing 9 0.076 0.135
4. moderate 24 0.202 0.336
5. slightly right wing 40 0.336 0.672
6. right wing 33 0.277 0.950
7. very right wing 6 0.050 1.0
Note: The question stated was: “Below is a seven-point scale on which the
political views that people might hold are arranged from very left-wing to very
right-wing. Where would you place yourself on this scale?”
Table 5: Fairness views and political beliefs
Political view
left moderate right
P (EP |PV ) 0.368 0.246 0.250
(0.052) (0.050) (0.046)
P (CE|PV ) 0.319 0.304 0.255
(0.045) (0.050) (0.045)
P (EA|PV ) 0.313 0.451 0.495
(0.049) (0.059) (0.061)
N 40 40 39
Note: P (k|PV ) is the average a posteriori probability of holding fairness view
k ∈ {EA,CE,EP} among those who reported political view PV , calculated
according to (9) and using the estimates of specification (1) in Table 3. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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